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• 
Roqer J. Miner 
o.s. circuit Judqe 
The Reception of Foreign Law in the Federal Courts 
American Foreign Law Association 
Wednesday, May 17, 1995 
Drake Hotel, New York City 
Noon 
I am very pleased for the opportunity to address the 
American Foreign Law Association on the occasion of its 1995 
annual meeting. Since 1925, your Association has been at the 
forefront in promoting the understanding and appreciation of 
foreign, comparative and private international law. As is well-
known, the membership of this organization is composed of 
distinguished lawyers, judges and legal scholars who regularly 
deal with legal issues that transcend national boundaries. I am 
proud to number among my friends and colleagues a number of 
officers and members of the Association. 
Your membership in this organization enables you to keep up-
to-date on recent developments in foreign, comparative and 
international law. Through your meetings, as well as through the 
American Journal of Comparative Law and your own Newsletter, you 
exchange ideas that are valuable to you individually in your work 
in the international arena. You also provide important public 
service as an Association by giving your views to the U.S. State 
Department with regard to treaties and private law conventions 
being considered by our government. Your public service also is 
manifested by your status as a Non-Governmental organization at 
the United Nations and by your participation in joint educational 
programs with other organizations concerned with international 
law. A little later, I shall propose a new project for this 
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venerable Association. This project will cause you to be of 
service to another important institution -- the federal courts of 
the United States. 
The global economy has brought an increasing variety of 
foreign law issues to the federal courts. Indeed, one 
international commercial transaction may implicate the law of 
several nations. Aside from foreign law issues arising in cases 
relating to foreign trade, federal courts throughout this nation 
are faced daily with immigration matters, tort claims, public law 
disputes, arbitration enforcement proceedings, domestic relation 
suits and even criminal cases that call for the determination and 
application of foreign law. These cases are beginning to form a 
significant part of the business of the federal courts. And yet 
the tendency of the federal courts is to duck and run when 
presented with issues of foreign law. Why should this be so, 
when we federal judges have at hand so many methods that we may 
employ to resolve foreign law issues? I think that the answer 
lies in our fear of the unknown. Let me give you an example. 
Less than two months ago, a panel of my court was confronted 
with an appeal from a district court judgment denying relief 
under a federal statute that allows for discovery in aid of 
foreign litigation. 1 The litigation for which assistance was 
sought was pending in France. The district court held, in light 
of the limited discovery allowed in France, that it would be 
contrary to French law and policy to permit the discovery to go 
forward here. The majority of the panel disagreed with the 
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district court and reversed, concluding that discovery assistance 
should be provided absent specific direction to the contrary by 
the foreign court. The majority saw the purpose of the statute 
as "promoting efficiency in international litigation and 
persuading other nations, by example, to do the same. 112 I, for 
one, have never assumed that it was the duty of our federal 
courts to persuade foreign courts to do anything. I certainly 
would never urge them to adopt our discovery practices. The 
dissenter in the case thought that.the discovery procedures 
allowed by the statute should not be used to evade disclosure 
limitations imposed by foreign tribunals. 
I do not say whether I agree with the majority or the 
dissent in this particular case. I refer to it only to draw your 
attention to some of the language in the majority opinion. 
Hearken to a portion of the rationale: 
The record reveals that this litigation 
became a battle-by-affidavit of international 
legal experts and resulted in the district 
court's admittedly "superficial" ruling on 
French law. • We think that it is unwise 
-- as well as in tension with the aims of 
[the statute] -- for district judges to try 
to glean the accepted practices and attitudes 
of other nations from what are likely to be 
conflicting and, perhaps, biased 
interpretations of foreign law. 3 
I suggest that this is the language of uncertainty, of 
avoidance, and of distaste for foreign law. But I think that the 
real kicker is in the first sentence of the majority opinion, 
where the issue is stated thus: 
This case raises the question of the 
degree to which federal district courts, in 
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deciding whether to order discovery under 
[the statute] in aid of foreign litigation, 
should delve into the mysteries of foreign 
law. 4 
The mysteries of foreign law! What an interesting observation in 
an era in which the law of foreign nations is so much with us in 
the federal courts! Be assured that I am not criticizing in any 
way my distinguished colleague who authored the opinion. He was, 
after all, Dean of the Yale Law School until he recently joined 
us. I use his language only to demonstrate that foreign law has 
not been welcomed in our federal courts. 
Our haste to avoid confrontation with foreign law leads us 
into some strange decisions. For example, a panel of my court 
some years back held as follows: 
While • • • a court is still permitted 
to apply foreign law even if not requested by 
a party, we believe that the law of the forum 
may be applied here, where the parties did 
not at trial take the position that 
plaintiffs were required to prove their 
claims under Vietnamese law, even though the 
forum's choice of law rule would have called 
for application of foreign law. 5 
It is strange indeed for a court to consciously apply the wrong 
law, based on the position taken by the parties, while 
acknowledging a discretionary authority to apply the right law. 
Such an approach with regard to questions of domestic law would 
be highly unusual. 
The decision that I used as my example, Vishipco Line v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank, was spawned by an action brought by 
Vietnamese corporations and individuals to recover funds 
deposited in the Saigon branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank. The 
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bank had closed the branch following the Communist takeover and 
argued that it was not obligated to make good on the deposits for 
a number of reasons. In another bizarre twist in that opinion, 
Vietnamese law was applied to Chase's affirmative defenses. The 
panel reasoned as follows: "While Chase invoked foreign law 
• with respect to its own affirmative defenses only, neither 
party invoked foreign law with respect to Chase's basic 
obligations to its depositors 
That case still is cited as precedent by the district courts 
in this circuit for the proposition that forum law should be 
applied where the parties do not provide the court with the 
appropriate foreign law. Just last year, a district court in the 
Southern District was confronted with claims that revolved around 
a contract providing that any disputes regarding its terms would 
be governed by Malaysian law. Citing the Vishipco case, the 
district court noted the failure of the parties to provide it 
with the applicable Malaysian legal principles, "deem[ed) the 
parties to have acquiesced in the application of local law and 
hence look[ed] to pertinent authority within the forum. 117 
The failure of the parties to establish foreign law also 
results in the application of the law of the forum in many other 
circuits. 8 My own view of the matter is that a court has the 
affirmative obligation to seek out the applicable foreign law 
whether the parties have established that law or not. Let me be 
clear about any disagreements that I might have with some of the 
decisions made by panels of my court in regard to the reception 
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of foreign law. Like all other judges of the court, I am bound 
by the precedent created by the panels. Our practice is that 
only an in bane court or a panel decision circulated to the 
entire court and not objected to can change precedent. 9 
We do have a federal rule, of course, that requires a party 
who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign 
country to give notice of that intention through pleadings or 
other reasonable written notice. 10 I refer, of course, to Rule 
44.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which my scholarly friend, 
District Judge Milton Pollack, discussed with you at some length 
when he spoke to this Association on the subject "Proof of 
Foreign Law" back in 1978. 11 Rule 44.1 provides that "[t]he 
court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant 
material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted 
by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence." 
This clearly provides the federal courts with a tremendous amount 
of flexibility in ascertaining foreign law. It is just too bad 
that they do not use it! 
Rule 44.1, originally adopted in 1966, concludes with a very 
important sentence and it is this: "The court's determination 
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law." This 
provision marked a vast change from earlier federal law, which 
treated foreign law as a fact question to be pleaded and proved, 
sometimes to the satisfaction of a jury! 12 Because decisions on 
foreign law were considered findings of fact, they could be 
resolved on appeal only if clearly erroneous. 13 Now, the 
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decisions on foreign law are specifically designated as rulings 
of law and thus may be reviewed on appeal de novo. 14 
It appears that some federal courts still have not gotten 
the word and continue to impose upon the parties a factual burden 
of proof of foreign law. In a case decided in the Southern 
District just two years ago, the court held that "[f]oreign law 
is a question of fact which must be proved. 1115 The court 
observed that affidavits of experts on Polish law were 
unsatisfactory and decided that a hearing would be required to 
decide the issues. Although the court certainly was entitled to 
take testimony, its decision on Polish law ultimately would be a 
legal one, not a factual one. One commentator has opined that 
foreign law implicates a mixture of fact and law under Rule 44.1. 
( He has characterized foreign law as "a tertium genus, a third 
category, between fact and law. 1116 I disagree and see the 
decision as purely one of law. Because I have this view, I think 
that it becomes the duty of the court to find and apply the 
relevant foreign law as soon as it becomes apparent to the court 
that foreign law governs. 
Accordingly, although it is highly desirable that the 
parties give notice under Rule 44.1 of the existence of an issue 
of foreign law at the earliest possible time, I do not think such 
notice is essential to bring the issue into the case. There are 
many courts that have considered failure to give adequate notice 
of a foreign law issue another reason for applying domestic 
law. 17 Among those courts is my own, the Second Circuit Court 
7 
of Appeals. In Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 18 a panel of my 
court said that it was acceptable for the district court to apply 
New York law in determining the obligations of the directors of a 
Canadian corporation. The reason given was that no party claimed 
that Canadian law was applicable, and each party "seems to have 
assumed that New York law governs. 1119 This approach puts me in 
mind of a case that I encountered in my early days as a traveling 
rural trial lawyer. The case was an action to recover the price 
of some lumber that the plaintiff had sold to the defendant. 
When my adversary and I appeared for a pre-trial conference 
before the elderly county judge who was to hear the case, we 
advised the judge that the sale of goods at issue was governed by 
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. I shall never 
forget his response: "I have not yet learned the Uniform 
commercial Code," he said, "and I would like you both to 
stipulate to try this case under the old law." My adversary and 
I thought it best to adjourn the case so it could be heard by a 
judge who was more current on the law. I am sure you see the 
analogy with the approach to foreign law taken by some federal 
courts. 
In the past, courts have indulged in a variety of what I 
call fictitious presumptions concerning the governing law in 
situations where foreign law obviously is applicable but the 
parties have not pleaded or established it. One author has 
listed these presumptions as follows: "that the foreign law is 
the same as the forum's common law, that foreign law is identical 
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to the forum law, that foreign law is based on generally 
recognized principles of civilized nations, and finally, that the 
party by not proving the foreign law has essentially acquiesced 
to the forum law. 1120 I am particularly amused by the 
"principles of civilized nations" presumption because it seems to 
me so much easier to ascertain the law of one nation than to go 
to the trouble of identifying a rule common to all civilized 
nations. Presumptions just are not substitutes for the real 
thing. By now, you are aware of the fact that I consider it the 
duty of the federal courts, both trial and appellate, not only to 
identify issues of foreign law independently but to ascertain the 
correct law and apply it. Certainly, Rule 44.1 provides us with 
many ways to get it right. We must get all the help we can from 
( the lawyers in a case, of course, but we must assure ourselves 
that we have the right law to apply. That is the way we do it in 
regard to domestic law and that is the way we must do it in 
regard to foreign law. 
I think that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had it 
right when it stated that, in determining questions of foreign 
law, both trial and appellate courts must research and analyze 
the law independently. 21 In the case in which that statement 
was made, the Seventh Circuit undertook its own detailed analysis 
of the Spanish law relating to the right of a shareholder of a 
corporation to sue for injury to the corporation. The court 
quoted with approval in the course of its decision this statement 
by a commentator: '"All too often counsel will do an inadequate 
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job of researching and presenting foreign law or will attempt to 
prove it in such a partisan fashion that the court is obliged to 
go beyond their offerings. 11122 While I am in agreement with the 
idea that the courts must do their own analysis, I do not agree 
that the work of the attorneys often is inadequate. In most 
cases, the foreign law is completely and fairly presented on all 
sides, and the court can proceed to do its job. I once wrote an 
opinion for a panel of our court that revolved around the 
Ecuadorian Law of Guaranty and found the foreign law well and 
fully presented. 23 It is always a pleasure to have a case where 
the lawyers are so helpful, whether the case involves domestic 
law or foreign law. 
In fact, our federal courts have shown a commendable ability 
( to get their hands around foreign law when fully briefed on the 
issues. A few years back, a judge in the Southern District of 
New York had no trouble in identifying and applying the law of 
Kenya in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in a 
rhinoceros attack in Kenya. 24 The defendant was not the 
rhinoceros, but ABC Television, which had elicited the assistance 
of the plaintiff, a former big game hunter and safari guide, in 
making a documentary film. The plaintiff alleged that a 
photographer acted recklessly and provoked a rhinoceros cow to 
charge while defending her calf. The court denied a motion for 
partial summary judgment made by the defendants. 
A panel of my court just last year had no trouble in finding 
that a ruling of the Paris Court of Appeals conferring exequatur 
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on an arbitration award was within the category of judgments 
enforceable under the New York Money-Judgment Recognition Act. 25 
In deciding that the decree conferring exequatur was the 
functional equivalent of a French judgment for the sums specified 
in the award, we had the benefit of affidavits from a retired 
judge of the highest tribunal in France, the Cour de Cassation. 
A few years back, my court, apparently fully informed on the 
issue, dealt with the Dominican law of affiliation in an action 
brought against the Immigration and Naturalization service 
challenging a denial of preferential immigration status. 26 And 
in a case arising out of the purchase of furs at an auction in 
Finland, a Southern District court applied Finnish law without 
difficulty after examining the affidavits of Finnish attorneys 
( submitted by both sides. 27 The court also found in that case 
that the foreign law did not conflict with a strong public policy 
of the forum, an interesting issue that I may address on another 
occasion. 
But what if we are not confident that we are fully informed 
on the foreign law, and what if we are not informed at all? It 
seems clear that both our trial and appellate courts can turn to 
the lawyers for information. That is just what a southern 
District court did on a motion for summary judgment in a case 
that turned on the enforceability of contracts under Italian 
law. 28 It was not disputed that Italian law governed, but 
neither side provided the necessary information to enable the 
court to make the correct decision. In a written opinion, the 
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court was first constrained to disabuse counsel of the notion 
that the issue was a factual one to be resolved at trial. The 
court then directed the plaintiff to file within twenty days "a 
legal memorandum and accompanying documentation supporting its 
proposition that valid contracts existed under Italian law. 1129 
Defendant was afforded fifteen days in which to reply. I think 
that this was a very effective use of court resources, because 
the court was able to call upon its most important resource --
the lawyers in the case. 
Recalling the text of Rule 44.1, a court may consider any 
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not 
submitted by a party or whether or not admissible in evidence. 
This certainly gives us a much broader spectrum than we have in 
identifying domestic law. One treatise has listed the variety of 
sources and materials that federal courts have had reference to 
in ascertaining foreign law. These include the written or oral 
testimony of experts, home-grown and foreign; copies of a foreign 
country's code or laws, including statutory provisions of the 
relevant law in the original or in translation; reference works; 
decisions of foreign courts; law reviews and treatises; and the 
reports of special masters expert in foreign law and fluent in 
the foreign language. 30 
In the end, whatever the source, we federal judges must 
ourselves be certain that we have it right and that we do not 
allow a bad result just because we are on unfamiliar ground. A 
lot of what I now deal with in the Court of Appeals was 
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unfamiliar to me before I became a federal judge, but I cannot, 
in the manner of that old country judge, avoid the responsibility 
of deciding cases on the basis of correct law. I must use all 
the resources available to me to resolve the question. 
In most of the foreign law cases that I have participated 
in, the affidavits of experts have been supplied, along with 
copies of pertinent laws and codes. These have proved sufficient 
to allow me to make up my own mind about the applicable foreign 
law after completing any research that I have considered 
necessary. Foreign law experts come from many places. In a case 
now sub judice before a panel on which I am serving, a Columbia 
Law School professor and a former judge of the Supreme Court of 
the Netherlands have given affidavits of opinion on the Dutch law 
of civil conspiracy. Although the opinions differ, both 
affidavits are straightforward and helpful. 
I do not agree with those who consider an expert 
automatically suspect because he or she is retained by one side 
or the other. 31 If we think that we are getting some "junk" 
foreign law from an expert, we can take a leaf from the book 
given to us by the Supreme court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals. 32 In that case, it was determined that a 
federal judge should act as a gatekeeper in deciding whether to 
admit scientific evidence. I think that a federal judge can also 
act as a gatekeeper in deciding whether to accept the foreign law 
opinion of an expert. Testimony will sometimes be required to 
determine whether an expert's opinion is reliable or relevant. I 
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am not greatly enamored of taking testimony from a foreign law 
expert, however, and think that it would be necessary only in a 
rare case. 
It seems to me that the federal courts should make more use 
of court-appointed experts in all kinds of cases where an expert 
opinion would be helpful. I think that in close questions of 
foreign law, where experts engaged by the parties are in serious 
disagreement, the court should appoint its own expert in an 
effort to close the gap. Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence provides that "[t]he court may on its own or on the 
motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert 
witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to 
submit nominations." The issue for the expert may be clarified 
at a pre-trial conference and the expert's findings must be 
provided to the parties, who may depose or cross-examine the 
expert. The compensation of the court-appointed expert must be 
paid "by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the 
court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as 
costs. 1133 
The use of a court-appointed expert is a highly desirable 
tool for ascertaining the governing foreign law and, as one 
author has stated, "[p]ersuasive advice submitted to the court 
may prompt a stipulation that settles the foreign law 
question. 1134 The elaborate system provided by Rule 706 for 
testing the opinion of a court-appointed expert means that we are 
pretty sure of getting the foreign law right in a case where such 
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an opinion is given. It does not by any means, however, divest 
us of our independent duty of research, for the responsibility of 
arriving at a correct decision is ours and ours alone. 35 Expert 
opinion, whether from the parties or from a court-appointed 
expert is only one way for us to get there. And get there we 
must, without applying the law of the forum when it does not 
apply, without utilizing fictitious presumptions, without 
regarding the search for foreign law as an arcane enterprise 
whose mysteries we cannot fathom, and without evading the 
responsibility that every court in this nation has -- to find the 
law and apply it. 
And that brings me back to the American Foreign Law 
Association, an organization whose members include the foremost 
foreign law experts in our nation. I suggest that you undertake 
this project: prepare a booklet of your members who are willing 
to act as experts for cases in the federal courts. For each of 
these, specify the foreign law of his or her expertise, together 
with educational background, professional experience and present 
affiliations. Distribute these booklets to the federal trial and 
appellate courts throughout the nation and to those members of 
the bar engaged in international practice. Help us assure a 
warmer reception for foreign law in the federal courts. Help us 
dispel the mysteries of foreign law. Help us get it right. 
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